Indonesia's Constitutional Court Strikes Down Government Insult Rules, Academic Says Ruling Protects Critics
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SOLO, Central Java — Indonesia's Constitutional Court has struck down criminal provisions governing insults against the government and state institutions, a ruling that could strengthen the space for citizens to criticise those in power without fear of criminal prosecution, a legal academic said on Saturday (Aug. 29).
The ruling also draws an important constitutional line between protecting the dignity of state institutions and safeguarding citizens' right to express their views, said Dr. H. Ahmad Muhamad Mustain Nasoha, a law lecturer at UIN Raden Mas Said Surakarta. The government, he said, should respond to criticism with arguments and policy improvements rather than using criminal law as a shield against legitimate dissent.
The Constitutional Court on Friday (Aug. 28) granted in full a petition in Case No. 282/PUU-XXIII/2025 and ruled that Article 240, including its explanatory provisions, and Article 241 of Law No. 1 of 2023 on the Criminal Code were inconsistent with the 1945 Constitution and had no binding legal force.
Ahmad, who also heads the Center for Constitutional and Islamic Law Studies at the university's Faculty of Sharia, said the ruling marked an important development in Indonesia's constitutional democracy by reaffirming that criminal law should not be used to create fear among people when they criticise the government.
"Respect for the government cannot be interpreted as an obligation for citizens to remain silent or agree with every state policy," Ahmad said.
He said a key problem with the provisions was the lack of a sufficiently clear boundary between criticism and insult.
The phrase "insulting the government or state institutions", he said, could allow broad interpretations of various forms of expression, including policy criticism, evaluations, academic opinions, political expression and satire.
"Criminal provisions must provide clear boundaries so citizens can reasonably know when an expression remains within the scope of their constitutional rights and when it constitutes a criminal offence," he said.
Such ambiguity, Ahmad said, could conflict with the principles of lex certa and lex stricta, which form part of the legality principle in criminal law. Criminal offences, he said, must be clearly defined and should not be expanded through overly broad interpretation.
The issue is particularly significant in the digital era, he said, because Article 241 covered broadcasts, writings, images, recordings and dissemination through information technology.
Such provisions could potentially affect citizens' activities on social media and other digital public spaces, including political criticism, academic commentary and journalistic work.
Ahmad also warned that criminalising criticism could create a "chilling effect", in which people refrain from expressing their views because they fear that criticism or evaluation could be interpreted as a criminal offence.
"The greater the public authority held by a state institution, the greater its accountability to the people," he said.
He stressed that freedom of expression was not unlimited. Threats, defamation and other conduct meeting the elements of a criminal offence could still be subject to legal action.
But legitimate criticism, he said, should not be treated as a crime simply because it is harsh, sharp or unwelcome to those in power.
Ahmad said the court's ruling sent a broader constitutional message that criminal law should remain an instrument for protecting society while being constrained from becoming a repressive tool against freedom of expression.
"Criticism is not the enemy of government. It is part of public oversight and a democratic mechanism to ensure that power remains within constitutional boundaries," Ahmad said. (Gusti Haes)
